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1. Introduction 
 
This paper studies the economic effects of amendments on different types of labor laws 
(de jure reforms) as well as of the increasing use of contract labor (de facto reforms) in 
India.  More than in other countries, in India labor laws are an extremely contentious 
topic. According to some observers, they are among the most important constraints to 
income and job growth, especially in manufacturing and in the registered sector.  Firm-
level surveys reveal that Indian employers find labor laws to be more restrictive for their 
growth than in other countries.
 1  
2   In this view, restrictive labor laws along with 
infrastructure constraints largely explain why the manufacturing sector – accounting only 
for 15 percent of the GDP-- remains so small.   In contrast, many others claim that 
current labor laws are necessary to prevent millions of workers from being exploited and 
to create decent jobs.  Still others argue that given that 92 percent of economic activity 
takes place in the unorganized sector, labor laws have little bearing on the majority of 
workers or firms.
3  
 
In recent years, a few studies have assessed the impact of different aspects of labor 
legislation on economic and social outcomes in India. For the most part, such studies 
have focused on either job security regulations or some composite measures of labor 
regulations. Many have found regulations to have detrimental effects on employment, 
particularly in the registered sector. This study differs from former ones in at least three 
ways:  
                                                 
1 We use the words “formal”, “registered” and “organized” as synonyms. They all denote the fraction of 
production and employment that occurs in firms of more than 10 workers with power or 20 workers 
without power and for which the regulations contained in the  Industrial dispute act (IDA) apply. It follows 
that the terms “informal”, “unregistered” or “unorganized” cover the rest of output and employment.  
2  See Ahsan et al (2007).  
3 See for instance a BBC NEWS interview with Prof. K. Basu and the comments to the interview 
(2005/06/27)http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/4103554.stm. 
 
 
 
.  
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First, this paper examines which types of labor laws matter the most for economic 
outcomes. While in India Chapter Vb of the Industrial Disputes Act, which prohibits 
firms that employ 100 or more workers to retrench without permission from the state, 
draws the most attention, there are 45 pieces of central legislation covering many aspects 
of employment (such as payment of wages, industrial disputes, and social security) as 
well as a large number of state laws, whose effects need to be understood. For instance, 
compared to other countries, India loses a greater proportion of person-days and output 
due to strikes and lockouts, situation that is often associated with ineffective dispute 
resolution laws. We provide a first step in that direction by differentiating the effects of 
legislation that sets the machinery and procedures for the settlement of labor disputes 
from the effects of employment protection laws, including restrictions on firm closure. 
 
Second, while existing studies assess the effects of labor laws without considering that 
firms may have found ways to lessen the effects of laws on their activities, in this study 
we assess whether de facto deregulation dampened the effect of labor laws. Thus, a 
common practice is hiring temporary or contract workers by means of an agency or 
contractor. While contract labor can only be hired for certain occupations or activities, it 
is exempted from most labor regulations. The use of contract labor has increased 
enormously during the 1990s.  
 
Many studies cannot identify the effect of labor reforms from the effect of 
contemporaneous unobserved policy or macroeconomic changes. In this regard, this 
study follows Besley and Burgess (2004) and identifies the effects of labor reforms on 
economic outcomes by focusing on reforms at the state level. Since most policies and 
legislation other than labor laws are set at the national level, this approach allows 
identifying labor reforms from other contemporaneous policy and legal changes.  
 
 At the theoretical level, different types of laws are expected to cause differential impacts 
on economic variables because each involves a different combination of at least three 
effects: (1) a price effect, (2) an expropriation effect, and (3) a rigidity effect. Price 
effects occur when regulations increase the cost of labor. Expropriation effects are related   4
to holdup problems that occur when labor laws make it easier for workers to appropriate 
part of the returns of employers’ investments once they are sunk. Finally rigidity effects 
occur when labor laws make adjustment of labor (or other factors) more costly and 
difficult. While the price and the expropriation effect go in the direction of reducing the 
demand of labor, the rigidity effect is associated with less job destruction, and possibly, 
some net employment gains. Since theory is silent regarding which of these effects 
dominates, assessing the effects of different laws on economic and labor market 
performance becomes an empirical question, which we address in this paper.  
 
That remaining part is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief assessment of 
labor regulations in India.
4 Section 3 reviews previous studies assessing the effect of 
labor laws on economic outcomes. Section 4 describes the data used and the methodology 
pursued to assess the effects of de jure and de facto labor reforms on economic outcomes.  
Section 5 describes the main results concerning the impact of de jure labor reforms. 
Section 6 assesses the combined effects of de jure and de facto labor reforms. Section 7 
discusses reverse causality. Finally, Section 8 concludes.  
 
2. A Brief Description of Labor Regulations in India 
Labor laws in India are covered by a large number of separate Acts setting minimum 
wages, conditions of work, payment of wages, benefits, workers’ welfare, health and 
safety provisions, procedures for the resolution of industrial disputes, conditions for 
hiring and firing workers, and conditions for the closure of establishments.  Legislative 
authority over labor issues falls with both federal and state governments. Over the years, 
state governments have amended some central acts. In addition, there is also considerable 
variation in the implementation of the law across states. Therefore labor regulations both 
de jure and de facto vary considerable at state level.   
 
The most controversial labor regulations deal with the conditions for hiring and 
retrenching workers and with the closure of establishments.  A 1976 amendment to the 
                                                 
4 See also the reports of the first and second National Commission on Labour, the studies contained in the 
volume Reforming the Labour edited by Debroy, B. and P.D. Kaushik (2005) and Ahmad, Pagés and Roy 
(2007) among others for a more detailed description of labor laws and labor law enforcement in India.     5
1947 Industrial Disputes Act (IDA, 1947) made layoff, retrenchment and closure illegal 
except with the previous permission of the appropriated government for all firms with 
more than 300 workers. This coverage was subsequently extended in 1982 to all firms 
with more than 100 employees.
5 Permission to retrench or to close is rarely granted and 
unapproved separations carry a potential punishment of both a substantial fine and a 
prison sentence for the employer. Instead, actual compensation for retrenchment is low 
by international standards. In this event, any workman (as defined by the IDA) with more 
than 240 days of service is entitled to one month’s notice and 15 days of compensation 
for every year of service at 50 percent of basic wages plus dearness allowance.
6   
 
The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act also requires firms of more than 100 
employees (and in some states 50) to specify to workers the terms and conditions of their 
employment, while the IDA requires employers to provide Notice of Change (Section 9-
A) This requirement states that no employers can effectuate any change in the conditions 
of service of any workman without giving 21 days of notice. It should be stressed that 
shifting weekly schedules or days offs without notice could be in non compliance.   
(Sachdeva’s, 2003). 
 
The IDA also sets conciliation, arbitration and adjudication procedures to be followed in 
the case of an industrial dispute. It empowers national or state governments to constitute 
Labour Courts, Tribunals, National Tribunals, Courts of Inquiry, and Boards of 
Conciliation. The government has the monopoly in the submission of industrial disputes 
to Conciliation Boards, Courts, Tribunals or National Tribunals. Yet, the employer and 
the employer can, if they agree, refer the dispute to arbitration. After a dispute has been 
referred to arbitration, the government may also prohibit the continuation of any strike or 
lock-out.  In industrial disputes originated by the discharge or dismissal of a worker, the 
court of tribunals can reinstate the work in the conditions thy see fit if they deem such 
                                                 
5In addition, some states amended chapter Vb above and beyond what is specified in the central Act. For 
instance in 1980, West Bengal extended chapter Vb to firms hiring 50 or more workers.  
6 In the IDA, workers that are employed in managerial or administrative capacity or that being employed in 
a supervisory capacity draw wages above 1600 Rp. per month are not considered workman and therefore 
are exempted from the provisions of such Act.    6
discharge unjustified. If the employer decides to pursue the matter in a higher court, the 
employer is liable to pay the foregone wages during the period of proceedings.  
 
Contract workers and workers in casual, temporary (paid for 240 days or less in any 365 
day period) and badli (substitute) are not considered workmen under the IDA and are 
exempted from the application of severance pay, mandatory notice or retrenchment 
authorization. From this perspective, labor laws create important incentives to hiring non 
permanent workers. This process is limited by the vigorous opposition of the unions and 
by the restrictions on hiring contract and casual labor imposed by the Contract Labour 
Regulation and Abolition Act. This Act regulates the service conditions of contract labor 
in firms of 20 or more employees, providing for some basic welfare amenities and 
provisions against the delay in wage payment. Section 10 of this Act gives authority to 
the State to prohibit the use of contract labor in any establishment. The relevant factors 
considered are whether contract labor is employed in work which is of perennial nature 
and whether it is also done through regular employers in those establishments or in other 
establishment of similar nature. Notwithstanding such constraints, the share of contract 
labor in manufacturing has increased substantially during the last decade rising from 
around 12 percent of manufacturing employment in 1985 to 23 percent in 2002.   
 
But, importantly, there are significant differences in the level and evolution of contract 
labor across states. While some of these differences are likely to reflect differences in the 
industrial specialization patterns of each state, they can also reflect differences in the 
implementation and enforcement of contract labor laws across states. Thus, it is 
noteworthy that states such as Kerala and West Bengal, have very small fractions of 
contract labor in manufacturing and that such shares have remained constant over the 
years. In contrast, the share of contract labor is above 40 percent in a number of states, 
such as Gujarat, Orissa or Andhra Pradesh and has increased considerably in recent years.  
 
The large majority of labor Acts were enacted in the period 1940-1980. During the 
seventies and particularly during the 1980s, a number of central and state amendments 
increased the variability of the laws across states (see Appendix 1). In most cases, such   7
amendments increased employment protection. They also increased the cost to employers 
of solving an industrial dispute, although some changes in the opposite direction were 
also observed. In the nineties the legislative activity came to a halt, with no new 
amendments in the IDA or Contract Labor Acts. Yet while there have not been important 
changes in labor laws or in union formal presence or power, weakening law enforcement, 
increasing recourse to temporary workers, increasing use of casual and contract labor and 
a shifting stand of the judiciary –may have increased flexibility in the labor market 
(Ahsan et al, 2007).   
 
3. The Effect of Labor Market Regulations  
3.1 Previous Studies 
A number of studies have attempted to estimate the effects of labor market regulations on 
economic outcomes in India. Fallon and Lucas (1991) and (1993) studied the effect of job 
security laws by analyzing the effects of the 1976 introduction of chapter Vb in the 
Industrial Disputes Act (IDA), which mandated firms employing 300 or more workers to 
request permission from the government prior to retrench. They found a large impact on 
manufacturing jobs: formal employment for a given level of output declined by 17.5 
percent. Similarly, Dutta Roy (2004) examined the effects of the 1982 central amendment 
to the IDA, which extended the prohibition to retrench workers without government 
authorization to firms that employed hundred or more workers. The author found 
evidence of substantial adjustment costs in employment but no evidence that such costs 
are driven or altered by the IDA legislative amendment. Both studies however do not 
control for other macro or policy change that could confound the before-after 
comparison. 
 
Besley and Burgess (2004) isolate the effect of a labor reform in a given state, from 
changes in policies and macroeconomic variables that are common across states, thus 
better identifying the effect of labor laws, however their measure of regulations 
aggregates different types of labor regulations and therefore their results are not directly 
comparable to the other studies. They find labor regulations to have important adverse 
effects on output and employment, particularly in the registered manufacturing sector.    8
 
Hasan, Mitra and Ramaswamy (2003) examine whether differences in labor laws explain 
differences in the way labor markets adjusted to trade reforms. They find that states with 
more stringent labor regulations (measured as in Besley and Burgess 2004) have lower 
demand elasticities and these elasticities are less affected by trade reforms. 
 
Finally Lall and Mengistae (2005) examine the influence of labor market regulations –as 
perceived by employers—on plant productivity differences across Indian cities. They find 
that differences in the degree of labor regulations, jointly with differences in the severity 
of power shortages, explain a large share of the productivity gaps between cities.  As in 
Bestley and Burgess (2004)  by aggregating different labor laws into one unique measure, 
they cannot identify which labor laws are the ones responsible for adverse economic 
outcomes.  From the policy perspective, understanding which laws and regulation have 
more adverse effects is an important question. Since labor laws have proven very difficult 
to change, focusing precious political capital in reforming some aspects of the law may 
be one way to mobilize support behind reforms.  
 
3.2  Why Different Labor Laws May Have Different Effects on Economic Outcomes 
Different labor regulations are expected to cause differential impacts on economic 
variables because each may involve a different combination of at least three effects: (1) a 
price effect, (2) an expropriation effect, and (3) a rigidity effect. Price effects occur when 
regulations increase the cost of labor. Expropriation effects are related to holdup 
problems that occur when regulations make it easier for workers to appropriate part of the 
return of an employers’ investment once that investment is sunk
7. This is the case, for 
instance, when regulations increase workers’ ability to initiate and sustain industrial 
disputes. Finally rigidity effects occur when regulations make the adjustment of labor (or 
other factors) more costly and difficult.  Regulations that increase the price of labor or 
generate expropriation effects are expected to have a negative effect on the demand for 
labor. Instead, regulations that increase the cost of adjusting employment have 
ambiguous effects since they may cause a reduction of both job creation and  job 
                                                 
7 See Besley and Burgess (2002) for a simple model of the expropriation effect.    9
destruction (Bertola, 1990). Thus ultimately, whether regulations have a positive or 
negative effect on employment depends on whether their dampening effects on job 
creation are offset by a reduction in job destruction. The effects on capital will also 
depend on which of the three effects dominate. While the price and rigidity effect may 
lead firms to substitute labor for capital, the fear of expropriation may create strong 
disincentives on investment and capital formation.   
 
Regulations that specifically target employment adjustment such as chapter Vb are likely 
to induce large price and rigidity effects, and possibly some expropriation effects as 
workers’ bargaining power vis-à-vis employers increases the more secure workers feel in 
their job. On the other hand, regulations that increase the cost of solving industrial 
disputes are likely to generate expropriation effects associated with the increased 
uncertainty regarding firms’ ability to solve industrial conflict in their favor. They also 
create price effects as the price of labor involves the additional costs of handling labor 
disputes. Finally, they may also create some rigidity effects as dismissal related labor 
disputes become more costly for firms. The former implies that the effects of a given 
regulation on outcomes are ambiguous and depend on which of the three effects 
dominate. Therefore, the issue of what are the effects of different pieces of regulation on 
employment and other economic outcomes becomes an empirical question, one that we 
address in the rest of this paper. 
 
4.  Data and Methodology 
 
To perform this study we use a multiplicity of data sources at the state and, in some 
cases, at the state-industry level for the period 1959-1997.  Data on GDP at the state level 
and for the agricultural, non agricultural, construction, and manufacturing sector were 
obtained from the Besley and Burgess (2004) database. Data on net value added, wages, 
capital, employment and number of factories reported in the registered manufacturing 
sector at the industry and state level were obtained from the Annual Survey of Industries 
(ASI). Data on the percentage of contract workers in registered manufacturing in each 
state and year were also obtained from this source. Finally, data on industrial disputes   10
were obtained from the Labour Bureau. We provide a detailed description of variables 
and sources in the Appendix.   
We follow, with important modification, Besley and Burgess (2004), (hereafter 
BB) in exploiting the time variation in state amendments to central labor laws to identify 
the effect of such changes on economic outcomes. We identify amendments to two types 
of laws: (a) laws that regulate the procedures for the resolution of industrial disputes, 
which we name D and (b) laws that affect hiring and firing and in consequence, firms’ 
employment adjustment capacity, which we name A. Within the latter, we also 
distinguish amendments to Chapter Vb (c5b) from other amendments. Finally, we also 
use state and time variation in the use of contract labor to capture the effect of de facto 
labor reforms.  
 
Regarding laws that affect the resolution of industrial disputes, or D, we code as -1 all 
state amendments that reduce workers or employers’ capacity to initiate and sustain an 
industrial dispute or that expedite the resolution of industrial disputes. Instead, we code 
as -1 all amendments that restrict such capacity or extend the period of resolution of an 
industrial dispute. Finally, we code as 0 all the state-year pairs for which there is no 
change in industrial dispute related laws. For example, Andhra Pradesh passed the 
following amendment to the IDA in 1987: 
“If in the opinion of the state government it is necessary or expedient so to do for 
securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order or services or supplies essential to 
the life of the community or for maintaining employment or industrial peace in the industrial 
establishment it may issue an order which (i) requires employers and workers to observe the terms 
and conditions of an order, (ii) prohibits strikes and lockouts in connection with any industrial 
dispute.” 
 
Since this amendment restricts parties ability to initiate, sustain or win an industrial 
dispute it is coded as -1. Other examples of amendments concerning the resolution of 
industrial disputes are amendments that classify some services or industries as public 
utilities and therefore are subjected to more restrictive laws regarding strikes and lock-
outs.  Other amendments that are judged to expedite the resolution of industrial disputes   11
are instances when a state gives more prominence to conciliation or when it increases the 
powers of more expeditious courts thus reducing the average length of resolution.  
 
Regarding laws that reduce the capacity of firms to adjust employment to changing 
economic conditions, or A, we code as 1 all amendments that increase workers’ job 
security (and reduce firms capacity to adjust employment) either by limiting firms’ ability 
to retrench, by making layoffs more expensive, or by restricting firm closures. We code 
as -1 all amendments that go in the opposite direction and as 0 al state-years in which 
there are no changes.   The appendix provides a list of all state amendments classified as 
amendments on D or A and the assigned value of the code in each case. In years and 
states where there is more than one amendment to a particular type of law, we follow 
Besley and Burgess (2004) and for each state and date we aggregate individual scores as 
follows: we code as 1 if the sum of the individual scores is positive, -1 if is negative and 
0 if the sum is zero. With this procedure, we identify ten state amendments to D which 
are judged to reduce the possibility to initiate an industrial dispute or to reduce the 
average resolution time, and five amendments that go in the opposite direction. We also 
find ten state amendments to A, all in the direction of increasing workers’ job security 
and reducing firms’ ability to adjust their labor force. Within the latter, we also 
distinguish five state amendments to chapter Vb, which set a lower size threshold for the 
application of the prohibition to retrench without permission than what is specified in the 
central act. Noticeably, there have not been state amendments to the IDA after 1989.  
 
We relate labor regulations to economic outcomes, by estimating the following 
specification:  
it it a it t i it R X Y ε φ β τ τ + + + + = −1    (1) 
 
where Yit is an economic outcome such as manufacturing output, employment or wages  
in state i in period t,  Xit is a vector of state controls, and  τi and τt  denote a state and time 
dummy, respectively. Rit-1 is a vector of regulation measures, such as SumAit-1 , SumDit-1 
Sumc5bit-1  which refer to the accumulated sum of amendments in a given type of laws 
over time in a state up to period t.  In some specifications, outcome variables vary at the   12
industry-state level. We lag regulatory variables one period to account for the average lag 
between enactment and implementation. 
  
Table 2 reports the correlation between our regulatory measures and the regulatory 
measure described in Bestley and Burgess (2004). Interestingly, the correlation between 
sumD and the BB measure is .90, while the correlation between the latter measure and 
sumA is .54. Instead, we observe a much lower correlation between sumA and sumD or 
between sumc5b and sumD, indicating that these variables reflect different aspects of 
labor laws, and that as such, they can be treated as separate variables included together in 
the specifications.  
 
Table 3 provides summary statistics of the data used to estimate these specifications both 
at the state and at the state-industry level. On average, states enacted laws to restrict the 
occurrence and resolution time of industrial disputes and to increase job security relative 
to the central act. All data is reported in per capita, or per worker terms. Persons 
employed covers all employees (production and non-production) employed in a given 
time. In this context, the term workers refers to employees directly associated with 
production.  
 
 It should be noted that since most other economic reforms and policies are applied at the 
national level, this methodology allows to distinguish between the effect of labor laws, 
applied at the state level, and the effect of other contemporaneous policies and reforms, 
applied at the national level. It also allows distinguishing the effect of labor reforms from 
the effects of nation-wide shocks which is not usually possible by just comparing 
outcomes before and after the application of the laws. In all specifications, we account for 
the possible autocorrelation of the error term by estimating robust standard errors 
clustered at the state or at the state-industry level for state-level or industry-state level 
data, respectively (see Bertrand, Dufflo and Mullainathan, 2004).  
   13
5. Effects of de Jure Reforms 
In this section we report the results of estimating specification (1)  on a number of 
economic variables, such as per capita state output, state manufacturing output in the 
registered and in the non registered sector and employment, wages, capital stock and 
number of factories in the registered manufacturing sector. 
 
5.1. Effects on Output 
Table 4 reports the estimates of the impact of different labor market regulations on 
various output measures. As mentioned above, we include a full set of state and year 
fixed effects in all specifications. Such controls account for reforms and policies that 
affect all states as well as for unobservable differences across states that are constant over 
time. In addition, to avoid problems associated with error autocorrelation at the state level 
we compute standard errors allowing for clustering of the errors within states.  The 
results suggest that regulations on dispute resolution procedures have a larger effect on 
output outcomes than regulations on employment security. Nonetheless, a test of the 
equality of the coefficients does not reject the null hypothesis. Regulations have a higher 
impact on registered manufacturing output than in sectors such as agriculture or 
construction where regulations either do not apply or are mildly enforced. Yet, the results 
for per-capita state output are still sizeable and statistically significant indicating that 
states that restrict employment adjustment or increase the cost of settling labor disputes 
grow at a slower rate.  
 
We next asses the robustness of these results when we control for state specific policies 
and outcomes by means of two additional variables: the state budget deficit as a 
percentage of GDP and the logarithm of development expenditures per capita. The fiscal 
position captures the degree by which states implement responsible fiscal policy. The log 
of development expenditures controls for the degree by which state governments invest in 
the health and education of their citizens.  Since both indicators are likely to be correlated 
with labor policies and state output outcomes, its exclusion could bias the results. 
Following Besley and Burgess (2004) we also control for the logarithm of state 
population. As usual, we allow for clustering of the errors within states.   14
 
The results indicate that both dispute resolution regulations (sumD) and regulations that 
impede employment adjustment (sumA) are associated with strong negative effects on 
registered manufacturing output (Table 5). The results also suggest that both types of 
regulations contribute to expanding the size of the unregistered sector, although 
coefficients for the unregistered sector are statistically significant at conventional levels 
only for sumD.  The results against suggest a larger effect of sumD than of sumA, 
although an F test does not reject the hypothesis of equality of coefficients. The 
coefficients indicate large effects: on average, legal amendments that slow down the 
resolution of industrial disputes or reduce firm’s labor adjustment possibilities lead to a 
reduction in registered manufacturing output of between 15 and 20 percent, and expand 
unregistered manufacturing output between 6 and 7 percent. The former underscores that 
while laws intended to increase job security, such as chapter Vb, draw most of the 
attention, dispute-related laws can also exert a large, if not larger, effect on economic 
outcomes. 
 
We further attempt to identify the importance of job security regulations by estimating 
the effects of extending the scope of chapter Vb to smaller firms. Our results indicate that 
such amendments lead to a 24 percent decline in registered manufacturing output, 
although the estimates are not statistically significant at conventional levels.  
 
We next examine possible complementarities between amendments to chapter Vb in IDA 
and amendments in dispute resolution provisions. These complementarities might emerge 
from the fact that laws that enhance job security tend to reinforce workers’ bargaining 
power within the firm increasing their ability to initiate and sustain industrial disputes: 
the costlier is for a firm to resolve industrial disputes the higher might be the output cost 
of measures that enhance job security.   If this is the case, state amendments that increase 
job security will have a larger negative effect on output the higher is sumD. The results 
reported in Table 5 support this hypothesis (Columns 5-6). The negative sign on the 
interaction variable in column (9) suggests that both types of amendments feed each other 
compounding the adverse effects of both types of regulations on output. An amendment   15
to Chapter Vb in the direction of increasing job security, increases the effects of dispute 
resolution laws by another 21 percent points. Thus, the combined effects of amendments 
to job security and dispute resolution laws on registered manufacturing employment are 
very large. Such effects are reversed in the unregistered sector. In fact, the results indicate 
that is the combination of poorly designed dispute resolution procedures and job security 
laws what generates a large contraction (expansion) in the registered (unregistered) 
manufacturing sector. 
 
One possible criticism to the former results is that they could be driven by shifts in the 
composition of industries within manufacturing and states. In that case, we would be 
wrongly attributing those effects to regulations. Conversely, to the extent that some 
industries are more affected by regulations than others, the composition of manufacturing 
activity could shift towards industries less affected by regulations. In this latter case, 
manufacturing wide estimates would underestimate the effects of regulations within 
industries.  To account for such effects, we estimate the effects of regulations on net 
manufacturing value added per capita using variation at the state-industry level. To 
account for the presence of autocorrelation in the error term within industries and states, 
we calculate robust standard errors clustered at the industry-state level. We also include a 
full set of industry-state dummies, and year effects, plus the state policies controls we 
discussed above.  
 
The results presented in Table 6 confirm that results with aggregated data are robust to 
further disaggregation by industries and states. As before, we find that both sumA and 
sumD exert large and negative effects on manufacturing value added, and while the point 
estimates of sumD are larger than for sumA, the equality of coefficients hypothesis is not 
rejected by the data.  We also find large, negative and statistically significant effects of  
amendments that extend chapter Vb to smaller firms. According to these results, on 
average, state amendments on chapter Vb have been associated with an 18 percent 
reduction in manufacturing value added.  We also confirm the evidence for 
complementarities between sumD and amendments on chapter Vb. As found in the 
aggregate data, chapter Vb exerts influence through sumD, that is, its effects are much   16
larger and statistically significant in states where resolving disputes is costlier for 
employers. We also find evidence of complementarities between  sumD and sumA. 
 
In sum, the former results indicate that regulations that restrict employers’ ability to 
adjust employment or that increase the cost of solving industrial disputes are associated 
with large output losses in the registered sector and an expansion of the unregistered 
sector.  Importantly, we also find strong complementarities between different laws.  We 
next examine whether labor reforms that exert strong adverse effects on output can 
nonetheless make registered workers better off by shifting resources from capital to labor.  
 
5.2 Effects on Employment, Wages and Other Outcomes 
Regulations that increase the cost of settling labor disputes or adjusting labor also have an 
adverse effect on employment (table 7). Making use of state-industry variation, we 
distinguish between effects on total employment (persons employed) and the effects on 
the employment of workers directly involved in production (workers employed). The 
results are very similar when the aggregate rather than the disaggregate data is used. As it 
was the case for value added, the point estimates suggest a larger effect for sumD than for 
sumA, but a test of equality of coefficients is not rejected. We also identify large adverse 
employment effects of extending chapter Vb to smaller firms.   
 
The decline in the total number of persons employed associated with regulations is larger 
than the decline in the number of workers, suggesting higher adjustment costs for 
production than for administrative and managerial workers. The estimates also suggest 
strong complementarities between regulations affecting employment adjustment and 
dispute resolution procedures in regards to their effects on employment. It is worth 
emphasizing the large magnitude of the effects. According to our estimates, on average 
states that implement amendments that limit employment adjustment (increase sumA) 
experience a decline in manufacturing employment relative to states that do not reform 
(column (1)) This implies for instance that in the state of Maharashtra, the 1981 
amendment to chapter Vb of IDA, which extended the prohibition to retrench without 
government authorization from firms that employed 300 workers to firms that employed   17
at least 100 workers, could have implied a destruction of about 144,000 manufacturing 
jobs (relative to what went on in other states); another 104,000 manufacturing jobs could 
have been  lost in West Bengal in 1980, when a similar amendment was introduced. More 
caution should be applied to extrapolate our results to infer the effects of a possible 
reform in chapter Vb in the near future, since they are based on policy changes that 
occurred quite long ago in a different economic scenario. In addition, the only policy 
changes we observe are such that made regulations on firing workers more costly for 
employers. If laws have asymmetric effects depending upon the direction of the policy, 
our estimates cannot capture such effects. With these caveats in mind, we estimate that if 
the effect of amendments on chapter Vb is symmetrical and similar to what was observed 
in the past, lifting chapter Vb could add about 880,000 registered manufacturing jobs.     
 
Regulations that decrease value added and employment could benefit workers that hold 
on to a job in the registered sector if their wages increase substantially as a result of 
regulatory interventions. In table 8, we examine the effects of regulations on wages, 
productivity, labor share and other outcome indicators to obtain a better idea of the effect 
of regulations on workers’ bargaining power and welfare. The results indicate 
significantly different outcomes depending on the type of regulations. While state legal 
amendments that increase the cost of adjusting labor are associated with a small increase 
in wages, amendments that increase the cost of resolving industrial disputes have the 
opposite effect (column (1)). A test on the equality of effects of both types of regulations 
rejects the null hypothesis. 
 
Column (2) in table 8 suggests that the asymmetric effects in wages are driven by the 
differential effects on labor productivity. While labor policies that make employment 
adjustment more costly do not cause a significant dent on labor productivity, increasing 
the cost of settling labor disputes does. In turn, such effect is driven by a higher negative 
effect of sumD on the stock of capital, suggesting larger expropriation effects of dispute-
related regulations. 
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Adding the estimates in column (1) of table 8 with those in column (4) of table 7 we find 
that higher job security and costlier dispute resolution procedures reduce workers’ wage 
bill.   For legal amendments that increase A, the decline in employment more than offsets 
the small rise in wages.  As a result, total earnings for organized workers decline. This 
effect is stronger for regulations that increase D since they cause a decline in both wages 
and employment. Finally, the results in Column (3) of table 8 indicate that neither 
amendments on A nor D have been able to raise the share of value added in the hands of 
workers.  
  
Columns (5)–(7) of table 8 explore the channels by which labor regulations lead to 
employment and capital losses. In particular, it examines whether the reduction in 
employment and capital is associated with a decline in the number of firms (as a 
consequence of plant closures and foregone entry)   or with a decline in the average size 
of a plant (both in terms of number of workers and capital stock). We find that the bulk of 
the effects on employment come from a decline in the number of factories, while the 
number of workers per firm does not change significantly. We also find that about half of 
the reduction in capital associated with industrial dispute laws is driven by a reduction in 
the number of firms. The other half is driven by a reduction of the capital stock of the 
average plant. Results presented in the next section suggest that the latter is driven by the 
exit of more capital-intensive plants. These results underscore the importance of firm exit 
as means of adjustment when employment adjustment is impaired or when profit 
opportunities dwindle. They also call attention to the costs of regulation in terms of 
foregone employment and output due to the reduced creation of new firms.  
 
 
In sum, while labor regulations are generally seen as means to improve workers’ welfare 
our analysis suggests that in India did not achieve their intended goals. Instead, our 
findings indicate that more strict regulations are associated with firm closures, lower 
investments and reduced output in the registered sector. This in turn dries up the demand 
for labor, offsetting any positive effects on workers’ bargaining power brought by the 
laws. The end result is less job opportunities in the organized sector, and an expansion of   19
the unorganized sector.
8 This is particularly true for costlier dispute resolution, which not 
only are associated with lower net entry of firm and lower labor demand, but also with 
lower capital investments per firm, lower labor productivity and lower earnings for 
workers.     
 
5.3 Effect of Labor Disputes 
One question that arises from our results is the issue of what drives the adverse effects of 
labor dispute regulations. Are such effects brought by changes in firms’ decisions in light 
of new regulations or are rather driven by a disruption in production and employment 
directly caused by labor disputes?  Table 9 presents the results of re-estimating the basic 
specification controlling for the number of person-days lost to industrial disputes with the 
state-level data.
9  It is quite clear that the adverse results of the legislation do not arise 
from the direct losses associated with industrial disputes. Instead, the former suggest that 
the adverse effects of legislation concerning the resolution of labor disputes might arise 
from changes in firms’ investment decisions generated by the enactment of such laws. 
  
5.4 Effects by Industry  
Different industries might be differently affected by labor regulations. Micco and Pagés 
(2006) show that industries that are inherently more volatile –either because they 
experience more price variation, or because they are subjected to higher demand variance 
are more affected by labor regulations that inhibit employment adjustment. The degree of 
labor and capital intensity can also affect the extent by which some industries are affected 
by labor regulations relative to others. For example, regulations that increase the price of 
labor are likely to have a larger effect in labor-intensive sectors, as the price of labor 
constitutes a more important factor in their overall profitability.  
 
We make use of the state-industry variation to estimate the effect of regulations by 
industry (table 10). The results indicate that industries are not equally affected. In 
addition, industries that are more affected by employment adjustment regulations differ 
                                                 
8 Workers’ welfare could still improve as a result of labor laws if increased job security or higher benefits 
offset the negative effects of laws on the wage bill.  
9 Data on person-days lost in labor disputes are only available at the state level.    20
from industries affected by industrial dispute resolution regulations. Our results indicate 
that the repair of capital goods, and the production of cotton, silk and jute textiles, 
furniture, and food products tend to be more affected by job security than industries such 
as the production of basic chemicals, of metal products and parts, of rubber plastic and 
petroleum, and electricity generation and transmission. The effects are felt both in terms 
of a reduction in value added and jobs. Instead, the effect on wages is mixed. While in 
some industries the reduction in value added and jobs associated with employment 
adjustment regulations is accompanied by an increase in wages, in others, wages decline 
in a significant manner.  
 
In contrast, dispute resolution regulations affect more the production of metal products 
and parts, basic metals and alloy industries and basic chemicals and machinery and 
equipment, while the least affected industries are the food, apparel, paper and paper 
products, textiles, wood and furniture and repair of capital goods. 
 
The former suggests that the degree of labor or capital intensity of a given industry plays 
a role in how it is affected by an increase in sumA or sumD. The results presented in table 
11 confirm that this is indeed the case. Job security regulations lead to higher 
employment costs in more labor-intensive sectors (as measured by either the average 
labor share of an industry during the 1959-1997 period or the rank ordering of industries 
according to their average labor share during that same period).
10 Instead, capital-
intensive sectors are relatively more affected by dispute resolution procedures, suggesting 
that capital owners tend to find industrial dispute laws more threatening than job security 
laws and this is especially true in capital-intensive sectors. 
 
While at this point we can only speculate about the possible causes of such patterns, one 
explanation that fits the evidence is the following: Employment adjustment regulations 
are hard felt in labor intensive sectors because they involve substantial price effects 
                                                 
10 The degree of labor intensity of a given industry may be itself affected by labor regulations. To minimize 
this effect we estimate our specifications using both the average labor share and the relative degree 
(ranking) of labor-intensity in the 1959-1997 period by industry. While the average labor share is likely to 
have shifted, the ranking of industries is less likely to be affected by regulations.     21
which are more important for labor intensive sectors. These price effects come from at 
least two sources: First, prohibitions to retrench increase the cost of negotiated severance 
packages in voluntary retirement schemes negotiated between workers and firms. Second, 
job security laws raise earnings for workers who remain in their jobs.  Instead, 
regulations that increase the cost of settling an industrial dispute create substantial 
uncertainty regarding what the cost of an industrial dispute will be in the new scenario. 
As the threat of long and costly disputes shifts bargaining power to workers, capital 
owners react by reducing investments.  This in turn reduces the demand for labor and 
restores bargaining power for capital owners.  
 
6. The Effects of de facto Liberalization: The Use of Contract Labor  
The increasing use of contract labor is another area of heated controversy. While many 
consider this practice as one beset with exploitative tendencies, employers have been 
pressing for extended flexibility in the engagement of contract workers even in core and 
perennial activities.
11   The increasing use of contract labor across states may have 
provided employers with the flexibility required in the face of strict employment 
regulations. They may have also resulted in lower costs for firms and lower income for 
workers –as firms are probably able to pay less for contract labor than for regular 
workers. Given its significance in overall employment, it becomes important to 
understand the effects of the widespread use of this type of work.  To do so, we add three 
additional variables to specification (1). These variables are the share of contract labor in 
manufacturing by state and period, and two interaction terms between our labor law 
measures and the share of contract labor. As before, we account for the quality of policies 
implemented at the state level by controlling for fiscal deficit to GDP and log of 
developmental expenditures.  We also lag  these variables one period to minimize 
possible reverse causality problems. It is worth mentioning that adding these variables 
reduces considerably the size of the sample because a measure of the use of contract 
labor is only available since 1985.  It also constraints our sample to a time period (1985-
1997) where relatively fewer legislative changes took place. Given these restrictions, the 
                                                 
11 See for instance CII (2004).   22
coefficients on labor regulations are not directly comparable to those obtained with the 
whole sample.  
 
Our results provide some evidence that the increasing use of contract labor may be 
reducing the “bite” of labor law. Columns (1) and (2) in table 12 present the results of 
estimating the effect of regulations and its interaction with the share of contract labor 
using industry data aggregated at the state level. The coefficients on the interaction of 
regulations with contract labor in column 1 suggest that the detrimental effects on value 
added of both types of regulation are offset by the widespread use of contract labor. 
Considering that in the last year of the sample, contract labor accounted for 17 percent of 
manufacturing employment, our estimates imply that contract labor more than offsets for 
effect of amendments in job security laws and almost offsets the effect of amendments in 
dispute resolution laws.
12 Column (2) presents the results of the joint effect of regulations 
and contract labor using the aggregate measure of regulations developed by Besley and 
Burgess (2004). The positive coefficient on the interaction term suggests again that the 
use of contract labor outweighs the adverse effect of regulations. The results also indicate 
that the use of contract labor may increase value added independently of how stringent 
are labor market regulations as a result of higher labor productivity and/or lower labor 
costs. 
 
However, given the data available, we cannot rule out that the increasing use of contract 
labor comes as a result of changes in the composition of employment across industries 
rather than deliberate attempts to counterweight the impact of regulations. While some 
evidence suggest that the use of contract labor increased more in states whose industries 
opened more to trade and have more strict labor regulations, Ramaswamy (2005) reports 
substantial differences in contract labor intensity across industries.
 13  Therefore, marked 
                                                 
12 This is based on multiplying the coefficients on the interaction terms between regulations and share of 
contract labor by 17.2% which corresponds to the average use of contract labor in year 1996.  
13  In separate regressions not reported in this paper, we find some evidence that the increasing use of 
contract labor is associated with the interaction of trade liberalization and restrictive labor laws. More 
precisely, we regressed the logarithm of the share of contract labor in every state against a state specific 
measure of manufacturing tariffs, labor regulations and the interaction of labor regulations and tariffs, plus 
country and state dummies, and the policy controls used in most of our specifications. Using the Besley and 
Burgess (2004) measure of regulations, we find that the coefficients on both tariffs and labor regulations   23
shifts in the composition of industries within states could explain changes in the use of 
contract labor that would be unrelated to changes in enforcement policies or “de-facto” 
reforms. To account for this possibility, we re-estimate the results presented in column 
(1) using the industry-state variation, and thus controlling for the structure of 
manufacturing employment. We also present results for the same sample 1985-1997 but 
without including the contract labor variables to disentangle the effect of the inclusion of 
de facto variables from changes in the sample size.   
 
The results for value added using the industry-state variation are shown in column (3). 
While the sign of the coefficients is unchanged relative to the estimates in column (1)  the 
magnitude of the interaction coefficients is lower and the coefficients are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. Comparing the coefficients on the regulatory variables 
between columns (3) and a specification where we estimate model (1) with the same 
sample than in column (3) we find that the reduction in significance of sumA is not due to 
the introduction of contract labor but rather to the smaller number of observations.
14 If 
anything, the effect of the regulatory variables is stronger once the effect of contract labor 
is accounted for indicating that contract labor somewhat reduces the effect of regulations 
on output.  
 
Columns (4) and (6) presents similar results for total persons and workers employed. The 
coefficients on the interaction coefficients are either zero or very close to being zero, 
indicating little evidence that contract labor reduces the adverse effects of regulations on 
employment.  The former suggests that contract labor may be more effective at 
ameliorating the effects of regulations on output than on employment. This might be due 
to the fact that regulations reduce the capital-labor, and the output-labor ratio below what 
would be desired by firms. The introduction of contract labor ameliorates such effects by 
lessening the effect of regulations on output and investment. The higher the share of 
                                                                                                                                                 
are positive while the interaction of labor regulations and tariffs is negative. All coefficients are statistically 
significant at conventional levels. If we use our measures of regulations, i.e. sumA and sumD and their 
interactions with tariffs, we get that the signs of the coefficients are preserved but the coefficients are not 
statistically significant.  
14 Estimating specification (1) for the sample 1959-1985 yields strongly negative and statistically 
significant coefficients on sumA suggesting that the reduced variation after 1985 might be responsible for 
the reduced size and significance of the coefficient.   24
contract labor, the lower the expropriation effects brought by changes in dispute 
resolution laws. (Column (10)).   
 
It is also worth emphasizing that the introduction of contract labor can have a direct 
effect on employment and capital independently on labor regulations. Such direct effect 
may be attributed partly to a cost effect. The coefficient on contract labor in column (8) is 
negative, indicating that contract labor may reduce the per-worker price of labor and can 
therefore increase the demand for labor. Yet, contract labor is also associated with higher 
capital investments (column 10). While it is often emphasized that firms hire contract 
labor as a way to reduce wage and adjustment costs, the fact that these workers are not 
part of the labor force and hence cannot engage in industrial disputes and appropriate 
returns of capital may be an additional source of interest for employers.  
 
7. Reverse Causality  
The results described above suggest that there is a strong association between economic 
outcomes and labor regulations. However, one lingering concern is that such association 
may be driven by reverse causality. In particular, it is plausible that the expectation of 
poor outcomes in the near future increases the likelihood of reforms that either increase 
job security or make the resolution of disputes more costly. Such relation would generate 
a negative association between economic outcomes and labor reforms, and yet economic 
outcomes would not be driven by regulations. To address this concern, we re-estimate our 
former regressions extending the lag between legal amendments and economic outcomes 
to 5 and 8 years. While the anticipation of future poor economic outcomes may drive 
current legal amendments, it is unlikely that legislators or their constituencies can 
forecast future economic outcomes five or eight years in advance.  Table 13 presents our 
findings. Lagging the regulatory variables 5 or 8 periods does not alter our results.  
 
8. Conclusions  
 
Labor regulations are generally introduced to improve the lot of workers. However our 
results suggest that in India they are not achieving this goal. Not only have regulations   25
created large costs for society, but they have not raised workers’ labor share. Instead, 
workers have been left with an equal share of a much smaller cake. In the process a large 
number of job opportunities in the registered sector have been lost, and while some 
workers have found refuge in the informal sector, the swelling ranks in this sector are 
likely to be associated with lower earnings in this sector.  
    
We also find that while regulations such as chapter Vb of IDA tend to get all the 
attention, there are important costs associated with regulations that increase the cost of 
settling industrial disputes.  If anything, our findings suggest that their costs for society 
and for registered sector workers may be higher than those associated with job security 
laws. By reducing investment, employment and wages, they generate pure costs for 
workers and for the society as a whole. Improving the conciliation-arbitration-
adjudication is a pending reform that could bear important gains for all parties involved.
15  
 
Nonetheless, the attention on chapter Vb is well placed. Our results suggest important 
employment effects associated with the enactment of amendments to this chapter. 
Moreover, even when earnings may increase somewhat as a result of such policies, 
registered sector workers lose as employment opportunities dwindle and their wage bill 
declines with employment. Labor intensive sectors such as textiles are the hardest hit 
eroding the comparative advantage of India in labor intensive industries, and in the 
process removing viable job opportunities for a large number of people. 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, contract labor has become a common way to deal with these 
problems. Yet, such solution is no panacea. It further expands the degree of labor market 
segmentation by generating first and second-class workers within the manufacturing 
registered sector.  
 
Secondly, the widespread use of contract labor does not seem alleviate the adverse effects 
of labor regulations, particularly in regards to employment. Nonetheless, it has some 
positive direct effects on employment independently on labor regulations. Therefore, 
                                                 
15 On this issue see A.U. Khan (2005).   26
while further liberalization of the use of contract labor is likely to create some additional 
jobs and increase output and investment, it is unlikely to bring back the jobs lost due to 
inappropriate labor regulations.   
 
India must find alternative way to improve labor conditions for the majority of workers. 
While traditionally portrayed as labor advances against the abuses of capital, current 
labor regulations favor no one.  The answer to this conundrum does not involve a 
complete deregulation of the labor market. Instead, it requires better regulation (and 
appropriate enforcement) so workers’ fundamental rights can be protected and jobs can 
be created.
16  
                                                 
16 See Pagés and Roy (2005) for a related discussion of proposed labor reforms.      27
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Appendix: List of State amendments and coding of  D and A regulation measures (see notes 
at the end of the table)  
State Provision    Section Year Score  DS D AS A 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
Allows the appropriate government to declare 
any industry as a public utility if a public 
emergency or public interest requires so. In 
the central act only industries in the First 
Schedule (public utilities) may be declared 
thus. Public utilities are more limited in 
having strikes and lock-outs and the 
government has greater power to refer 
industrial disputes in public utilities service to 
the appropriate court. 
2 1949  -1  -1  0 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
States that where a Tribunal has been 
constituted under this Act for the adjudication 
of disputes in any specified industry or 
industries and a dispute exists or is 
apprehended in any such industry then the 
employer or majority of workmen may refer 
the dispute to that Tribunal. This facilitates 
referral of disputes to Tribunals as the process 
does not need to be intermediated by 
government. In the central act both sides have 
to apply to the government so it can refer the 
dispute to a court. 
10 1949  -1  -1 
-1 
0 
0 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
Any services in hospitals or dispensaries are 
classified as a public utility. Public utilities are 
more limited in having strikes and lock-outs and 
the government has greater power to refer industrial 
disputes in public utilities service to the appropriate 
court. In the central act these services are not 
classified as public utilities.   
2  1968 -1 -1 -1 0  0 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
A Labor Court or Tribunal is granted the power of 
a Civil Court to execute its award or any settlement 
as a decree of a Civil Court. 
11A-11D  1982 -1 -1 -1 0  0 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
If in the opinion of the state government it is 
necessary or expedient so to do for securing the 
public safety or the maintenance of public order or 
services or supplies essential to the life of the 
community or for maintaining employment or 
industrial peace in the industrial establishment it 
may issue an order which (i) requires employers 
and workers to observe the terms and conditions of 
an order. (ii) prohibits strikes and lockouts in 
connection with any industrial dispute. 
10A-10K 1987  -1  -1  0 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
Prior payment of compensation to the worker is a 
condition precedent to the closure of an 
undertaking. Under the central act payment of 
compensation does not need to be made prior to 
closure. 
25FFF 1987  1 0  1 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
Where a closed firm is re-opened, workers who 
were on the roll of a given unit should be given the 
opportunity to offer themselves for employment in 
preference to others. Under the central act 
retrenched workers are given preference but there is 
less specify as regards rehiring workers from the 
same unit. 
25H 1987  1  0 
0 
1 
1   30
Andhra 
Pradesh 
Where a worker is reinstated by an award of a 
Labour Court or Tribunal, his wages will be paid 
from the date specified in that award whether or not 
he has been reinstated by the employer. 
 
25HH 1987  1 0  1 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
Failure to comply an order by the state Government 
which constrains industrial dispute activity in the 
interests of the public is punishable with 
imprisonment for a period which is not less than six 
months and with a fine. 
 
29A 1987  -1  -1  0 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
In the case of an industrial dispute involving an 
individual worker he has the right to apply directly 
to the Labour Court for adjudication. No such right 
is specified in the central act. 
 
2A 1987  1  1  0 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
In place of the Collector, the Chief Judicial 
Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate are 
given the power to recover from an employer 
money owing to a worker as the result of settlement 
of an industrial dispute. 
 
33C 1987  1  1  0 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
If an employer wants to change the conditions of 
service applicable to any worker he has to give him 
a notice of 42 days (instead of 21) 
9A 1987  1  0  1 
Gujarat  Failure of the employer to nominate his 
representatives to Councils within firms is 
punishable by a fine of 50 rupees and in the case of 
continuing failure to do so the employer will pay an 
additional fine which may extend to 50 rupees per 
day for every day that such failure continues. 
30-30A  1973  1 1 1 0 0 
Karnataka  In the case of an industrial dispute involving an 
individual worker he may within a six months 
period have the right to apply directly to the Labor 
Court for adjudication. No such right is specified in 
the central act. 
10 1988  1  1  0 
Karnataka  Increases the power of the conciliation officer in 
terms of enforcing attendance at hearings regarding 
industrial disputes, compelling the production of 
documents and issuing commissions for the 
examination of witnesses. Also makes clear what 
the penalties are for non-attendance or failure to 
produce relevant documents. 
11 1988  -1  -1  0 
Karnataka  The state government obtains the power to transfer 
any industrial dispute pending before a tribunal to 
any other tribunal constituted by the state 
government for adjudication. 
10A-10K 1988  -1  -1  0 
Karnataka  If in the opinion of the state government it is 
necessary or expedient so to do for securing the 
public safety or the maintenance of public order or 
services or supplies essential to the life of the 
community or for maintaining employment or 
industrial peace in the industrial establishment it 
may issue an order which (i) requires employers 
and workers to observe the terms and conditions of 
the order (ii) prevents any public utility service 
from closing. 
10A-10K 1988  -1  -1 
-1 
0 
1   31
Karnataka  The rules for lay-off, retrenchment and closure may 
according to the discretion of the state government 
be applied to industrial establishments of a seasonal 
character and which employ more than 100 but less 
than 300 workers. Under the central act these rules 
only apply to permanent establishments, which 
employ more than 300 workers. 
25K 1988  1  0  1 
Kerala  If in the opinion of the state government it is 
necessary or expedient so to do for securing the 
public safety or the maintenance of public order or 
services or supplies essential to the life of the 
community or for maintaining employment or 
industrial peace in the industrial establishment it 
may issue an order which (i) requires employers 
and workers to observe the terms and conditions of 
the order (ii) prevents any public utility service 
from closing. 
10A-10K 1979  -1  -1  0 
Kerala  Failure to comply an order by the state 
Government, which constrains industrial dispute 
activity in the interests of the public is punishable 
with imprisonment for a period, which is not less 
than six months and with a fine. 
29A 1979  -1  -1 
-1 
0 
0 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
 
Increases the power of the labor court to try 
offences covered both under the Industrial Disputes 
Act as well as offences covered under a range of 
other Acts pertaining to labor (which are specified 
in the Second Schedule of the Industrial Disputes 
Act). 
7 1982  -1  -1  0 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
Labour court is given the power to deal with every 
offence punishable under the Labour Disputes Act 
as well as under a range of other central acts 
dealing with labour issues. 
34 1982  -1  -1  0 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
In the case of criminal cases the Labour Court shall 
have all the powers under the Code of Criminal 
Procedure of a Judicial Magistrate of the First 
Class. 
 
11A-11D 1982  -1  -1 
-1 
0 
0 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
(i) Undertakings dealing with construction of 
buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or other 
construction work are no longer exempted from 
procedures for closing down undertakings. (ii) 
State government as opposed to central government 
is deemed the appropriate government in dealing 
with negotiations regarding procedures for closing 
down undertakings. 
25O  1983  1 0 0 1 
 
 
1 
 
 
Maharashtra  Discontinuation or reduction of power supply to an 
industrial establishment can be used a reason for 
lay-off (for which workers will receive 
compensation). Under the central act only shortage 
of coal, power or raw materials or the accumulation 
of stocks or the breakdown of machinery are listed 
as valid reasons for lay-offs 
2 1981  1  0  1 
Maharashtra  If being laid off is not due to electricity problems 
then the workers receive 100% of their wages as 
compared to the normal 50%. 
25C 1981  1  0  1 
Maharashtra  The rules for lay-off, retrenchment and closure may 
according to the discretion of the state government 
be applied to industrial establishments of a seasonal 
character and which employ more than 100 but less 
than 300 workers. Under the central act these rules 
only apply to permanent establishments which 
employ more than 300 workers. 
25K 1981  1  0 
0 
1 
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Maharashtra  Any employer or worker affected by the decision to 
close down an enterprise is permitted for 30days 
from the date of permission to close being granted 
appeal to an Industrial Tribunal to overturn the 
decision. 
25O  1983  1 0 0 1 1 
Orissa  The rules for lay-off, retrenchment and closure may 
according to the discretion of the state government 
be applied to industrial establishments, which 
employ more than 100 workers. Under the central 
act these rules only apply to establishments, which 
employ more than 300 workers. 
25 K  1983  1  0  1 
Orissa  Any employer or worker affected by the decision to 
close down an enterprise is permitted for 30 days 
from the date of permission to close being granted 
appeal to an Industrial Tribunal to overturn the 
decision. 
25O 1983  1  0 
0 
1 
1 
Rajasthan  Member is defined as someone who is an ordinary 
member of a Union and who has paid a 
subscription of not less than four annas per month 
and who is not in arrears as regards these payments. 
Such an exact definition does not exist under the 
central act. 
2 1960  -1  -1  0 
Rajasthan  The definition of employer in the context of an 
industrial dispute also includes owners who have 
contracted with persons for the execution of work 
as part of the industry. 
2 1960  1  1    0 
Rajasthan  Registrar is defined as the person appointed to be 
the Registrar of Unions. This makes it clear who is 
involved in the bargaining process on behalf of the 
unions. This definition does not appear in the 
central act and hence might be subject to 
interpretation. 
2 1960  -1  -1  0 
Rajasthan  Union is defined to be a trade union of employees 
registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act, 
1926. This makes it clear who is involved in the 
bargaining process on behalf of the unions. This 
definition does not appear in the central act and 
hence might be subject to interpretation 
2 1960  -1  -1  0 
Rajasthan  The state government has to appoint a Registrar of 
Unions and may also appoint Assistant Registrars 
of Unions to work in local areas. This makes it 
clear who can represent unions within Work 
Committees. 
3 1960  -1  -1 
-1 
0 
0 
Rajasthan  The state government has the right to refer an 
industrial dispute to an Industrial Tribunal if it is 
satisfied that (i) public peace or safety is 
threatened, serious or prolonged hardship of part of 
the community is likely to be caused or the industry 
concerned is likely to be seriously damaged, (ii) the 
industrial dispute is unlikely to be settled by other 
means or (iii) it is in the public interest to do so. 
10A-10K 1970  -1  -1  0 
Rajasthan  If in the opinion of the state government it is 
necessary or expedient so to do for securing the 
public safety or the maintenance of public order or 
services or supplies essential to the life of the 
community or for maintaining employment or 
industrial peace in the industrial establishment it 
may issue an order which (i) requires employers 
and workers to observe the terms and conditions of 
the order. (ii) prevents any public utility service 
from closing. 
10A-10K 1970  -1  -1 
-1 
0 
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Rajasthan  Failure to comply an order by the state 
Government, which constrains industrial dispute 
activity in the interests of the public is punishable 
with imprisonment for a period, which may extend 
to one year or with a fine, which may extend to two 
thousand rupees or with both. 
30-30A 1970 -1  -1  0 
Rajasthan  Widens the scope of awards for which the worker 
can obtain judicial help with securing money owed 
by a employer to include awards made as the result 
of an order issued by the state Government to 
constrain industrial dispute activity in the interests 
of the public. 
33C 1970  1  1  0 
Rajasthan  This describes the supervisory duties of the 
Registrar of Unions and the rules for registration of 
unions (which is obligatory). One duty of the 
Registrar is to ensure that only one union (that with 
the largest employment) represents a single unit 
within an industry. 
9C 1970  -1  -1  0 
Rajasthan  The rules for lay-off, retrenchment and closure may 
according to the discretion of the state government 
be applied to industrial establishments of a seasonal 
character and which employ more than 100 but less 
than 300 workers. Under the central act these rules 
only apply to permanent establishments, which 
employ more than 300 workers. 
25K 1984  1  0  1 
Rajasthan  Under the central act where workers in a mine have 
been laid off for reasons of fire, flood or gas 
explosion the employer doesn't have to receive 
prior consent. However, the employer has to apply 
for permission to continue the lay-off beyond 30 
days. Here that condition is removed 
25M 1984  -1  0  -1 
Rajasthan  Union representatives have to be involved in any 
negotiations concerning retrenchment of workers. 
Their involvement is not stipulated under the 
central act. 
25N 1984  1  1  1 
Rajasthan  Undertakings dealing with construction of 
buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or other 
construction work are no longer exempted from 
procedures for closing down undertakings. 
25O 1984  1  0  1 
Rajasthan  The maximum penalty for lay-off and retrenchment 
of workers without permission is increased to 
imprisonment for three months or a fine of two 
thousand rupees or both (from the one month 
imprisonment or a fine of one thousand rupees or 
both) which are the terms stipulated in the central 
act. 
25Q 1984  1  0  1 
Rajasthan  The procedures for lay-off and retrenchment 
specified in Chapter V-A of the central act are 
deemed to be applicable to industrial 
establishments of a seasonal character and which 
employ more than 100 but less than 300 workers. 
Under the central act these rules only apply to 
permanent establishments which employ more than 
300 workers. 
25S 1984  1  0 
1 
1 
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Tamil Nadu  Allows the appropriate government to declare 
any industry as a public utility if a public 
emergency or public interest requires so. In 
the central act only industries in the First 
Schedule (public utilities) may be declared 
thus. Public utilities are more limited in 
having strikes and lock-outs and the 
government has greater power to refer 
industrial disputes in public utilities service to 
the appropriate court. 
2 1949  -1  -1  0 
Tamil Nadu  States where a Tribunal has been constituted 
under this Act for the adjudication of disputes 
in any specifed industry or industries and a 
dispute exists or is apprehended in any such 
industry then the employer or majority of 
workmen may refer the dispute to that 
Tribunal. This facilitates referral of disputes to 
Tribunals as the process does not need to be 
intermediated by government. In the central 
act both sides have to apply to the government 
so it can refer the dispute to a court 
10 1949  -1  -1 
-1 
0 
0 
Tamil Nadu  If in the opinion of the state government it is 
necessary or expedient so to do for securing the 
public safety or the maintenance of public order or 
services or supplies essential to the life of the 
community or for maintaining employment or 
industrial peace in the industrial establishment it 
may issue an order which (i) requires employers 
and workers to observe the terms and conditions of 
the order and (ii) prevents any public utility service 
from closing. 
10A-10K 1982  -1  -1  0 
Tamil Nadu  Failure to comply an order by the state government, 
which constrains industrial dispute activity in the 
interests of the public is punishable with 
imprisonment for a period which is not less than six 
months and with a fine. 
29A 1982  -1  -1 
-1 
0 
0 
Tamil Nadu  Increases the power of the conciliation officer in 
terms of enforcing attendance, compelling the 
production of documents and issuing commissions 
for the examination of witnesses. 
 
11 1988  -1  -1  0 
Tamil Nadu  In the case of an industrial dispute involving an 
individual worker he has the right to apply directly 
to the Labour Court for adjudication. No such right 
is specified in the central act. 
2A 1988  1  1 
0 
0 
0 
West Bengal  Any worker who presents himself and is given 
employment for that day cannot be laid off for that 
day. However, if he didn't receive a work within 2 
hours he is deemed as being laid off. Under the 
central act only the second condition holds. 
2  1974  1 0 0 1 1 
West Bengal  Workers involved in sales promotion are included 
in the definition of workers. This category of 
employment is not specified in the central act. 
2 1980  1  1  1 
West Bengal  Retrenchment, which means termination of 
employment of a worker, does include workers 
terminated on grounds of continued ill-health. In 
the central act termination for these workers is 
excluded from the definition of retrenchment. 
2 1980  1  0 
1 
1 
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West Bengal  A report of the outcome of conciliation proceedings 
must be submitted within 60 days of the 
commencement of conciliation proceedings. In the 
central act the same report must be produced within 
14 days. 
12   1980  1  1  0 
West Bengal  In the case of public utility service, the conciliation 
proceeding is deemed to start on the day, the notice 
of a strike or lockout is received by a conciliation 
officer. In the case of other industries the 
conciliation proceeding is deemed to start on the 
date conciliation officer asked the parties to join a 
conference. Under the central act the conciliation 
proceeding in all industries have to start on the day 
that notice of a strike or lockout is received by a 
conciliation officer. 
20 1980  1  1   
West Bengal  A Labour Court or Tribunal is granted the power of 
a Civil Court to execute its award or any settlement 
as a decree of a Civil Court. 
11A-11D 1980  -1  -1  0 
West Bengal  (i) Provides greater detail on the procedures for 
making awards from Labour Courts or Tribunals 
including necessary signatories and the timing of 
awards. (ii) The state government also retains the 
right to reject, modify any award made by a Labour 
Court or Tribunal 
17A 1980  1  1  0 
West Bengal   The limit of 45 days for workers receiving 50% of 
their wages upon being laid off (if they worked 
more than a year) is removed. 
25C 1980  1  0  1 
West Bengal  Where a lay-off extends for more than seven days 
then the worker only has to present himself once a 
week at the plant in order to be entitled to 
compensation as opposed to daily as stipulated 
under the central act. 
25E 1980  1  0  1 
West Bengal  Prior payment of compensation to the worker is a 
condition precedent to the closure of an 
undertaking. Under the central act payment of 
compensation does not need to be made prior to 
closure. 
25FFF  1980 1  0  1 
West Bengal  Where a closed firm is re-opened, workers who 
were on the roll of a given unit should be given the 
opportunity to offer themselves for employment in 
preference to others. Under the central act 
retrenched workers are given preference but there is 
less specify as regards rehiring workers from the 
same unit. 
25H 1980  1  0    1 
West Bengal  Where a worker is reinstated by an award of a 
Labour Court or Tribunal, his wages will be paid 
from the date specified in that award whether or not 
he has been reinstated by the employer. 
25HH 1980  1 0  1 
West Bengal  The rules for lay-off, retrenchment and closure may 
according to the discretion of the state government 
be applied to industrial establishments, which 
employ more than 50 workers. Under the central 
act these rules only apply to establishments, which 
employ more than 300 workers. 
25K 1980  1  0  1 
West Bengal  The period after which, if the appropriate 
government has not responded, the employer can 
commence layoffs (i.e. treat his application as 
granted) is extended from 2 to 3 months. 
25M 1980  1  0 
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West Bengal  In place of the Collector, the Chief Judicial 
Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate are 
given the power to recover from an employer 
money owing to a worker as the result of settlement 
of an industrial dispute. 
33C 1980  1  1  0 
West Bengal  If an employer wants to change in the conditions of 
service applicable to any worker he has to give him 
a notice of 42 days (instead of 21) 
9A 1980  1  0  1 
West Bengal  Provides greater detail on the duties of Labour 
Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals with 
respect to procedure, hearings, commencement of 
award and the amount of interim relief admissible 
to workers that have been discharged, dismissed or 
retrenched. 
15  1986  1 1 1 0 0 
West Bengal  In the case of an industrial dispute involving an 
individual worker if no settlement is arrived at 
within 60 days the party raising the dispute can 
apply directly to a conciliation officer. Within 60 
days from the conciliation officer's certificate they 
can apply to refer the dispute to labour court. No 
such right is specified in the central act. 
10 1989  1  1  0 
West Bengal  In their application to close down an undertaking 
the employers have to demonstrate their ability to 
discharge their liability for payment of 
compensation to workers. 
 
25O 1989  1  0  1 
West Bengal  Refusal of employment is added as grounds for an 
individual worker to enter into an industrial dispute 
with his/her employer. Only discharge, dismissal, 
retrenchment or other termination of employment, 
are mentioned as grounds in the central act. 
2A 1989  1  1 
1 
0 
1 
Source: Data Appendix for Besley and Burgess (2004) and updated until 2002 according to Sachdeva’s 
(2003). Each labor reform is coded in the following way:  a 1 denotes a change that is pro-labour or anti-
employer, a 0 denotes a change that is judged not to affect the bargaining power of either workers or 
employers and a -1 denotes a change which is regarded to be anti-worker or pro-employer. AS is the code 
of each individual reform related to labor market adjustment, while A is the consolidated score for labor 
reforms related to labor adjustment in a given state and year. Likewise, DS is the code of each individual 
reform related with labor disputes, while D is the consolidated  
   37
Appendix (Continuation) Definition of variables and data sources  
Name of variable   Description   Source  Period 
available 
Output measures   Net State Domestic Product, for all sectors, agriculture, 
non-agriculture (all sectors excluding agric.), construction 
and manufacturing. 
 EOPP 
Database  
1960-1997 
Person-days lost in 
industrial disputes 
Sum of person days lost in industrial disputes in the 
Central and State sphere.  
 Labor 
Bureau 
and 
EOPP 
Database 
1965-1997 
State fiscal Deficit   State expenditures minus state revenues    1960-1997 
Population   Rural and urban population (‘000)  EOPP 
database 
1959-1997 
Development 
Expenditures 
Government expenditures in health and education    1959-1997 
Net Value added    Value added created in factory. Computed as value of 
output minus the gross value of input and Depreciation.  
ASI   1959-1997 
Productive capital  It refers to the last date of operation in the year. It includes 
fixed (FK) and working capita (WK). FK is the sum of 
land, buildings, plant machinery and tools and other fixed 
assets. It also includes intangible assets. WK consist of 
stock of materials, fuel, semi-finished goods, cash in hand 
and at the Bank and the sum of pending payments to 
creditors 
ASI 1959-1997 
No of persons 
employed 
Average number of all employees, engaged in production 
(workers) plus employees in supervisory, managerial and 
administrative work in a day of work. It is computed 
adding all workers in all shifts and dividing by days of 
work  
ASI 1959-1997 
Workers   Number of Workers. The term workers exclude persons 
holding positions of supervision and management or 
employed in confidential positions. It includes apprentices 
as well as persons employed thought contractors 
ASI 1967-1997 
Wages to Workers  All renumeration payable more or less regularly in each 
pay period to workers. (direct wages+bonuses (it excludes 
severance pay, payments in kind and employers 
contributions to social security. They are expressed in 
gross terms, that is before employees contributions to 
social security and welfare funds.  
ASI 1967-1997 
Number of factories 
Registered 
Factories registered under the Indian Factories Act 1948. 
Refers to any premises where ten or more workers are 
working (if factory uses power) an twenty if it doesn’t. 
ASI 1959-1997 
The EOPP Indian States Data Base from the STICERD, London School of Economics is available online at 
http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/eopp/research/indian.asp .  ASI is the Annual Survey of Industries produced by the 
Central Statistical Organization, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, India.  Prior to 1973 only 
data for the sample factory sector (firms that employ 50 workers or more with power or 100 without power) 
is available while data from 1974 onwards refers to the overall factory sector (firms that employ at least  10 
worker with power or 20 without power). While the data for the two periods is not strictly comparable, the 
time dummies included in our specifications account for the difference. Estimates in which data from the 
factory survey was extended backwards for the period 1959-1973 using the growth rate of the sample 
factory sector in the period 1959-1973 yielded very similar results. 
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Table 1 
state 1985 1990 1995 2002
Kerala 1.6 1.8 1.5 2.33
Assam 8.2 6.4 7.9 3.95
Tamil Nadu 6.9 5.2 4.4 7.21
West Bengal 4.6 5.1 5.3 7.63
Delhi 7.5 7.4 4.8 7.64
Karnataka 11.5 10.4 8.1 9.33
Punjab 19.1 8.8 10.8 14.32
Maharashtra 5.7 6.4 12.8 16.34
Bihar 9.8 8 7.8 22.08
Rajasthan 8.8 13.2 14.1 22.25
Madhya Pradesh 13.6 23.1 21.5 23.94
Uttar Pradesh 14.2 12.6 13.5 25.92
Haryana 19 9.9 14.8 28.07
Gujarat 14.5 19.9 23.5 31.27
Jammu & Kashmir 25.4 8 16.1 31.55
Orissa 30 26 28.7 40.14
Andhra Pradesh 33.8 39.9 49.2 62.08
TOTAL 12.1 13.5 16.8 23.22
Source: Annual Survey of Industries
Percentage of Contract Labor in Manufacturing across Indian 
States
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Table 2 
Pairwise correlations among regulatory variables
sumA sumD sumc5b Bbreg
sumA 1
sumD 0.2239* 1
sumc5b 0.8322* 0.1949* 1
Bbreg 0.5490* 0.9095* 0.4328*   1
 SumA denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA 
amendments relative to Adjustment of Labor; sumD 
denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments 
relative to resolution of Labor Disputes; sumc5b denotes 
the cumulative sum of all the amendments relative to 
Chapter 5b. BBreg denotes the regulatory measure 
constructed by Besley and Burgess (2004).  * denotes 
significant at 5%.; * significance at 5 %.  
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Table 3 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SumA 624 0.237 0.587 0 3
SumD 624 -0.277 0.893 -3 3
Sumc5b 624 0.119 0.324 0 1
BBreg 624 -0.122 1.017 -3 4
GDP per capita* 591 2.84E-02 3.40E-02 2.18E-03 1.99E-01
GDP manufacturing per capita* 591 4.52E-03 6.97E-03 1.59E-04 5.40E-02
Registered manuf. GDP per capita* 591 2.94E-03 4.94E-03 3.63E-05 4.22E-02
Net value added*  8504 2.47E-04 6.77E-04 6.92E-09 1.62E-02
Persons employed per capita 8630 5.94E-04 9.53E-04 1.15E-07 9.77E-03
Workers employed per capita 7125 4.71E-04 7.60E-04 1.14E-07 8.41E-03
Number registered factories per capita 8634 6.25E-06 1.05E-05 2.85E-08 1.09E-04
Earnings per worker* 7121 1.48E-01 1.53E-01 2.06E-03 1.52E+00
Labor share (workers) 7008 4.34E-01 1.45E+00 1.44E-03 6.97E+01
Productive capital per capita* 8607 8.59E-04 2.79E-03 1.47E-08 7.23E-02
 Summary Statistics: 1959-1997
State level data
State-Industry level data (Registered Manufacturing Sector)
 All values marked with (*) are in '00000 of Rs. SumA denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to 
Adjustment of Labor; sumD denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to resolution of Labor Disputes; 
sumc5b denotes the cumulative sum of all the amendments relative to Chapter 5b. BBreg denotes the regulatory measure 
constructed by Besley and Burgess (2004).  See Section 4 and Appendix for details on the construction of regulatory 
variables and data sources. 
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Table 4 
De Jure Reforms and Gross Domestic Product at the State Level: 1958-1997
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log GDP per 
capita
Log 
Agricultural 
GDP per 
capita 
Log Non 
Agricultural 
GDP per 
capita
Log GDP in 
Construction 
per capita
Log 
Manufacturing 
GDP per capita 
Log Registered 
Manufacturing 
GDP per capita 
Log Non  
Registered 
Manufacturing 
GDP per capita 
sumA[t-1] 0.011 0.003 -0.013 -0.018 -0.079 -0.158 0.055
(0.27) (0.09) (0.31) (0.25) (1.15) (1.87)+ (0.60)
sumD[t-1] -0.045 0.001 -0.073 -0.078 -0.1 -0.192 0.031
(1.92)+ (0.05) (2.91)* (1.15) (2.19)* (3.33)** (0.80)
Number of Obs. 591 591 591 591 591 591 591
Adjusted R-squared 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.95 0.98 0.97 0.95
Ftest A=D (P.value) 0.35 0.96 0.3 0.59 0.84 0.75 0.85
In addition to the regressors shown in this table, all specifications include year and state fixed effects; sumA denotes the 
cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Adjustment of Labor; sumD denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA 
amendments relative to resolution of Labor Disputes; Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered 
a the state level reported in  parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  42
 
Table 5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log registered 
Manuf. Ouput 
per capita
Log 
unregistered 
Manuf. Ouput 
per capita
Log registered 
Manuf. Ouput 
per capita
Log 
unregistered 
Manuf. 
Ouput
Log registered 
Manuf. Ouput 
per capita
Log 
unregistered 
Manuf. 
Ouput per 
capita
sumc5b[t-1] -0.241 0.047 -0.164 0.021
(1.24) (0.32) (1.23) (0.16)
sumA[t-1] -0.149 0.062
(1.99)+ (0.79)
sumD[t-1] -0.202 0.074 -0.107 0.032
(5.80)** (2.32)* (2.10)+ (0.60)
sumc5b[t-1]*sumD[t-1] -0.218 0.11
(3.59)** (1.86)+
Log of Fiscal Deficit to GDP -0.002 0.039 -0.014 0.044 -0.004 0.04
-0.14 (2.25)* -0.72 (2.72)* -0.3 (2.40)*
Log of Develop. Exp. per capita 0.579 0.322 0.723 0.256 0.551 0.33
(2.15)* (1.34) (2.31)* (1.01) (1.91)+ (1.30)
Log of Population 1.542 -1.839 0.522 -1.414 0.8 -1.46
(2.20)* (1.69) (0.52) (1.31) (1.28) (1.42)
Number of Obs. 590 590 590 590 590 590
Adjusted R-squared 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.96
Ftest A=D 0.59 0.9
In addition to the regressors shown in this table, all specifications include year and state fixed effects; sumA denotes the 
cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Adjustment of Labor; sumD denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA 
amendments relative to resolution of Labor Disputes; sumc5b denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to 
Chapter 5b. Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered a the state level reported in  parentheses. + 
significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
De Jure Reforms and Gross Domestic Product at the State Level: 1958-1997
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Table 6 
Effects of Regulations on Value Added. State and Industry Variation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Net 
Manufacturing 
Value Added per 
Capita
Log Net 
Manufacturing 
Value Added 
per Capita
Log Net 
Manufacturing 
Value Added per 
Capita
Log Net 
Manufacturing 
Value Added 
per Capita
sumA[t-1] -0.104 -0.079
(1.66)+ (1.30)
sumD[t-1] -0.257 -0.145 -0.157
(4.83)** (1.78)+ (1.92)+
sumc5b[t-1] -0.182 -0.078
(1.81)+ (0.77)
sumc5b[t-1]*sumD[t-1] -0.241
(2.93)**
sumA[t-1]*sumD[t-1] -0.061
(2.28)*
Log of Fiscal Deficit to GDP 0.028 0.014 0.028 0.028
(2.05)* (1.00) (2.06)* (2.07)*
Log of Develop. Exp. per capita 0.321 0.53 0.265 0.278
(1.85)+ (3.07)** (1.53) (1.62)
Log of Population 0.868 -0.497 -0.023 0.325
(1.04) (0.59) (0.03) (0.37)
test sumA[t-1]=sumD[t-1] 0.13 0.67 0.5
Observations 8214 8214 8214 8214
Adjusted R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
In addition to the regressors shown in this table, all specifications include year and state-
industry fixed effects; sumA denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative 
to Adjustment of Labor; sumD denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments 
relative to resolution of Labor Disputes; sumc5b denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA 
amendments relative to Chapter 5b. Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard 
errors clustered a the state-industry level reported in  parentheses. + significant at 10%; * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 7 
 Effects of de Jure Labor Regulations on Employment. State-Industry Variation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of 
persons 
employed 
per capita
Log of 
persons 
employed per 
capita
Log of 
persons 
employed 
per capita
Log of 
workers 
employed 
per capita
Log of 
workers 
employed 
per capita
Log of 
workers 
employed 
per capita
sumA[t-1] -0.11 -0.098
(2.08)* (2.08)*
sumD[t-1] -0.158 -0.08 -0.122 -0.028
(3.69)** (1.30) (3.58)** (0.58)
sumc5b[t-1] -0.183 -0.123 -0.141 -0.132
(2.18)* (1.41) (1.91)+ (1.66)+
sumc5b[t-1]*sumD[t-1] -0.169 -0.175
(2.66)** (3.55)**
Log of Fiscal Deficit to GDP 0.017 0.008 0.017 0.02 0.014 0.02
(1.93)+ (0.87) (1.87)+ (2.51)* (1.76)+ (2.45)*
Log of Develop. Exp. per capita 0.33 0.46 0.292 0.158 0.28 0.119
(2.17)* (3.04)** (1.91)+ (1.45) (2.47)* (1.08)
Log of Population -0.252 -1.115 -0.883 -0.026 -0.695 -0.761
(0.36) (1.62) (1.18) (0.04) (1.11) (1.11)
Observations 8334 8334 8334 7050 7050 7050
Adjusted R-squared 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.92
Ftest A=D 0.55 0.74
In addition to the regressors shown in this table, all specifications include year and state-industry 
fixed effects; sumA denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Adjustment of 
Labor; sumD denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to resolution of Labor 
Disputes; sumc5b denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Chapter 5b. 
Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered a the state-industry level 
reported in  parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 8 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log of 
earnings 
per worker
Log of labor 
productivity
Log of 
share of 
income to 
workers
Log of 
productive 
capital per 
capita
Log of 
Factories 
Registered 
per capita
Log of 
Workers 
per Factory
Log of 
productive 
capital per 
Factory
sumA[t-1] 0.033 0.032 0.001 -0.152 -0.112 0.002 -0.037
(1.78)+ (0.92) (0.03) (2.24)* (1.93)+ (0.04) (0.60)
sumD[t-1] -0.06 -0.077 0.016 -0.215 -0.105 -0.053 -0.112
(4.25)** (3.05)** (0.70) (3.57)** (1.83)+ (1.11) (1.91)+
Log of Fiscal Deficit to GDP 0.007 0.016 -0.008 0.036 0.014 0.004 0.022
(1.98)* (1.50) (0.80) (2.55)* (1.48) (0.43) (1.61)
Log of Develop. Exp. per capita -0.016 -0.045 0.025 0.395 0.435 -0.105 -0.03
(0.34) (0.49) (0.31) (2.10)* (2.56)* (0.68) (0.16)
Log of Population 0.659 0.993 -0.341 1.317 -0.93 0.679 2.232
(2.33)* (1.91)+ (0.73) (1.49) (1.06) (0.93) (2.65)**
Observations 7047 6940 6937 8311 8336 8334 8311
Adjusted R-squared 0.95 0.82 0.42 0.9 0.89 0.80 0.83
Ftest A=D 0 0.04 0.74 0.56 0.95 0.54 0.48
In addition to the regressors shown in this table, all specifications include year and state-industry fixed 
effects; sumA denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Adjustment of Labor; sumD 
denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to resolution of Labor Disputes; sumc5b denotes 
the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Chapter 5b. Absolute t-statistics calculated using 
robust standard errors clustered a the state-industry level reported in  parentheses. + significant at 10%; * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Effects of de Jure Regulations on Other Outcomes. State-Industry Variation
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Table 9 
State-level estimates 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Registered 
Manufacturing 
GDP per capita 
Log of 
persons 
employed 
per capita
Log of 
workers 
employed 
per capita
Log of 
earnings 
per worker
log of mandays lost in industrial disputes[t-1] 0.024 0.042 0.046 -0.002
-1.17 (2.99)** (3.23)** -0.21
Log of Fiscal Deficit to GDP 0.006 0.032 0.03 0.007
-0.39 -1.63 -1.57 -1.27
Log of Develop. Exp. per capita 0.301 0.075 0.104 -0.116
(1.98)+ -0.52 -0.71 -0.8
Log of Population 1.813 0.291 0.115 0.655
(2.71)* -0.36 -0.14 -1.28
sumA[t-1] -0.144 -0.097 -0.1 0.012
(2.26)* -1.38 -1.45 -0.3
sumD[t-1] -0.176 -0.123 -0.122 -0.045
(4.45)** (4.03)** (3.73)** -1.52
Observations 496 466 453 449
Adjusted R-squared 0.98 0.92 0.88 0.98
Are results driven by the losses occasionated by industrial disputes?
In addition to the regressors shown in this table, all specifications include year and state fixed effects; 
sumA denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Adjustment of Labor; sumD 
denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to resolution of Labor Disputes; sumc5b 
denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Chapter 5b. Bbreg denotes  Bestley and 
Burgess (2004) measure of regulations. Tariffs measure the evolution of manufacturing tariffs at the 
state level. Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered a the state level reported 
in  parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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Effect of an amendment to sumA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Net 
Manufacturing 
Value Added per 
Capita
Log of persons 
employed per 
capita
Log of 
workers 
employed 
per capita
Log of 
earnings 
per worker
Repair of capital goods -0.933 ** -0.875 ** -1.015 ** 0.701 **
Cotton, Silk, Jute textiles -0.638 ** -0.491 -0.398 ** -0.079 *
Wood, furniture -0.609 ** -0.457 ** -0.397 ** -0.094 +
paper, paper products -0.446 ** -0.361 ** -0.351 ** 0.038
Transport equipment and parts -0.209 -0.271 * -0.252 ** 0.029
Food -0.186 + -0.108 -0.125 0.154
Water works & supply -0.186 0.123 0.138 0.109 **
Basic Metals and Alloy industries -0.185 + -0.106 -0.106 -0.036
Gas generation and distribution -0.144 -0.722 * -0.713 * 0.214 *
Apparel -0.139 -0.304 -0.037 0.104 **
Beverages, Tobacco -0.115 0.134 0.238 * -0.12 +
Non Metalic products -0.077 -0.176 -0.158 + -0.006
Machinery & equipment -0.059 -0.147 + -0.23 ** 0.001
Other manufacturing equipments -0.05 -0.137 -0.066 0.038
Basic Chemicals 0.009 0.012 -0.1 0.013
Metal products and parts 0.166 0.171 0.126 0.035
Rubber, plastic, petroleum 0.189 0.181 0.242 0.07
Electricity generation and transmision 0.223 * 0.103 + -0.044 0.2 **
leather, leather products 0.551 ** 0.454 * 0.317 + 0.044
Effect of an amendment to  sumD
Metal products and parts -0.579 ** -0.519 ** -0.413 ** -0.06 +
leather, leather products -0.555 ** -0.394 ** -0.48 ** -0.087
Basic Metals and Alloy industries -0.432 ** -0.228 + -0.122 -0.194
Basic Chemicals -0.424 ** -0.357 ** -0.183 ** 0.033
Machinery & equipment -0.372 ** -0.184 * -0.079 + -0.044 +
Gas generation and distribution -0.345 0.394 0.357 -0.161
Electricity generation and transmision -0.322 ** -0.162 * 0.037 -0.243 **
Rubber, plastic, petroleum -0.283 -0.329 -0.311 + -0.021
Transport equipment and parts -0.263 -0.194 -0.128 -0.064 *
Non Metalic products -0.255 ** -0.142 + -0.109 -0.024
Beverages, Tobacco -0.227 -0.218 * -0.23 * -0.05
Other manufacturing equipments -0.216 ** -0.061 -0.11 -0.081 *
Food -0.194 * -0.13 -0.061 -0.129 **
Apparel -0.157 -0.069 -0.283 -0.038
paper, paper products -0.134 -0.079 -0.036 -0.058
Cotton, Silk, Jute textiles -0.011 0.037 0.044 0.034
Wood, furniture 0.015 0.115 0.162 + -0.079 +
Repair of capital goods 0.103 ** 0.102 ** 0.135 ** -0.254 **
Water works & supply 0.258 0.111 0.023 0.088 **
Each value denotes the coefficient on sumA and sumD in regressions which include year, state*industry fixed effects, Log of 
state fiscal deficit to GDP, log of state development expenditures and log of state population as controls. sumA denotes the 
cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to Adjustment of Labor; sumD denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA 
amendments relative to resolution of Labor Disputes;  Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered a 
the state-industry level reported in  parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 11 
 
Do effects vary depending on Labor Intensity of Industries?
(1) (2)
Log of persons 
employed per capita
Log of persons employed 
per capita
sumA[t-1] -0.001 0.059
(0.01) (0.72)
sumD[t-1] -0.29 -0.283
(3.09)** (3.46)**
sumA[t-1]* labor share -0.257
(1.26)
sumD[t-1]* labor share 0.313
(1.64)
sumA[t-1]* ranking labor share -0.016
(2.50)*
sumD[t-1]* ranking labor share 0.012
(1.85)+
Observations 8334 8334
Adjusted R-squared 0.89 0.89
F test-A (P. Value) 0.05 0.51
F test-D (P. Value) 0.84 0.0005
In addition to the regressors shown in this table, all specifications include year and state-
industry fixed effects, Log of state fiscal deficit to GDP, log of state development 
expenditures and log of state population as controls.; sumA denotes the cumulative sum of 
all IDA amendments relative to Adjustment of Labor; sumD denotes the cumulative sum of 
all IDA amendments relative to resolution of Labor Disputes;  Ranking labor share refers to 
the ranking of labor share across industries. Higher rankings imply higher skill content or 
higher labor share. Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered a 
the state-industry level reported in  parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%  49
Table 12 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Log registered 
Manuf. Ouput 
per capita
Log registered 
Manuf. Ouput 
per capita
Log Net 
Manufacturing 
Value Added 
per Capita
Log Net 
Manufacturing 
Value Added per 
Capita
Log of 
persons 
employed 
per capita
Log of 
persons 
employed 
per capita
Log of 
workers 
employed 
per capita
Log of 
workers 
employed 
per capita
Log of 
earnings per 
worker
Log of 
earnings per 
worker
Log of 
Productive 
Capital
Log of 
Productive 
Capital
sumA[t-1] -0.098 -0.006 0.032 -0.03 -0.01 -0.026 -0.009 -0.036 -0.041 0.055 0.036
(1.46) (0.07) (0.42) (0.38) (0.17) (0.33) (0.15) (1.15) (1.69)+ (0.43) (0.37)
sumD[t-1] -0.131 -0.177 -0.159 -0.054 -0.049 -0.048 -0.042 -0.057 -0.065 -0.011 0.053
(4.78)** (2.76)** (2.62)** (1.05) (1.00) (0.89) (0.82) (2.90)** (3.46)** (0.11) (0.56)
Share of Contract Labor[t-1] 0.006 0.01 0.007 0.006 0.006 -0.003 0.015
(0.78) (2.06)+ (1.17) (1.63) (1.73)+ (1.45) (2.49)*
sumA[t-1]*Share of Contract labor[t-1] 0.012 0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(2.40)* (0.66) (0.21) (0.08) (0.35) (0.26)
sumD[t-1]*Share of Contract labor[t-1] 0.007 0.01 0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.008
(2.34)* (2.06)+ (1.07) (0.30) (0.18) (1.07) (2.77)**
Regulation_BB[t-1] -0.108
(1.67)
Regulation_BB[t-1]*Share of Contract Labor 0.008
(2.95)*
Observations 191 191 3310 3310 3310 3310 3310 3310 3310 3310 3290 3290
Adjusted R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.91 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.91 0.91 0.94 0.94
Level of Agreggation?  State State
state -
industry
state -
industry
state -
industry
state -
industry
state -
industry
state -
industry
state -
industry
state -
industry
state -
industry
state -
industry
Ftest A=D 0.66
Ftest A_SCL =B_SCL 0.32
De Facto De-regulation. Effects of Widespread Use of Contract Labor
In addition to the regressors shown in this table, all specifications control for Log of Fiscal Deficit to GDP, Log of Development Expenditures per Capita and Log of Population. 
Specifications (1)-(2) include year and state fixed effects while specifications (3) and above include year and state-industry fixed effects; sumA denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA 
amendments relative to Adjustment of Labor; sumD denotes the cumulative sum of all IDA amendments relative to resolution of Labor Disputes;  Absolute t-statistics calculated using 
robust standard errors clustered at the state level in specifications (1)-(2) and at the state-industry level in specifications (3) and above, reported in  parentheses. + significant at 10%; * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  50
Table 13 
Coeff. t-st Coeff. t-st
Log Net Manufacturing Value 
Added per Capita -0.114 (2.30)* -0.133 (3.18)**
Log of persons 
employed per capita -0.108 (3.38)** -0.115 (3.78)**
Log of workers 
employed per capita -0.112 (3.44)** -0.12 (3.91)**
Log of productive 
capital per capita -0.112 (2.04)* -0.141 (2.91)**
Log of earnings per 
worker -0.019 (1.21) -0.027 (1.91)+
Coeff. t-st Coeff. t-st
Log Net Manufacturing Value 
Added per Capita -0.119 (2.20)* -0.168 (3.79)**
Log of persons 
employed per capita -0.104 (2.62)** -0.121 (3.59)**
Log of workers 
employed per capita -0.095 (2.51)* -0.118 (3.79)**
Log of productive 
capital per capita -0.133 (2.20)* -0.142 (2.70)**
Log of earnings per 
worker 0.01 (0.62) -0.042 (3.09)**
Reverse Causality? Regulatory variables lagged 5 and 8 periods
sumA[t-8] sumD[t-8]
sumA[t-5] sumD[t-5]
Each line corresponds to a separate regression. In addition to lagged measures of 
regulations, each regression includes country*sector fixed effects, year dummies, 
state fiscal balance as a fraction of state GDP, log state population and log of state 
development expenditures.   Absolute t-statistics calculated using robust standard 
errors clustered at the state-industry level reported in  parentheses. + significant at 
10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. State-industry variation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 